typically occur annually. Since 2012, China and Russia have also held annual joint naval exercises, which encompass reciprocal port visits, personnel exchanges, and extensive Russian naval weapons sales to China. The two countries conducted joint naval maneuvers before 2012, but only as a maritime component of the "Peace Mission" exercises. However, the three most recent maritime drills took place independent of the SCO, a trend that will likely continue.
These Chinese and Russian joint and multilateral exercises have several purposes. First, they are designed to improve the operational proficiency of the participating militaries and increase their interoperability. Second, Chinese and Russian representatives have cited the advantages of collaborating with foreign armed forces to learn new tactics, techniques, and procedures. In particular, these drills enhance the ability of both militaries to deter and suppress regional terrorism and mass popular unrest, such as the protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the Uzbekistani city of Andijan in 2005. Engaging in major multinational military exercises is especially important for the PLA, which has not fought an active war in decades. Third, the drills affirm China's and Russia's commitment to military cooperation as an important dimension of their evolving relationship despite their lack of a formal defense alliance. Fourth, these exercises help the two militaries learn more about each other's evolving military capabilities and promote confidence building between them. Finally, Chinese and Russian authors-whose countries share a good, but not espe-
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cially close or extensive, relationship-describe these drills as promoting bilateral trust and reassurance and supporting the broader goals of the SCO.
Thus far, these exercises have not established a solid basis for joint Chinese-Russian military operations, even in Eurasia. The drills do not rehearse integrated military operations to the same degree as, for instance, the U.S. Army does with its European or Asian military allies. At best, the Chinese and Russian armed forces can now better deconflict any parallel operations in a common military campaign such as might occur in a joint effort to suppress a major Islamist insurgency in a Central Asian country. Even so, these two countries' exercises continue to grow in scope, complexity, and integration. Consequently, the Chinese-Russian defense relationship has the potential to become one of the most significant international security developments, and so the partnership should be closely monitored by the U.S. Army and other U.S. government agencies. 
